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Abstract—We consider an inverse reinforcement learning prob-
lem involving “us” versus an “enemy” radar equipped with a
Bayesian tracker. By observing the emissions of the enemy radar,
how can we identify if the radar is cognitive (constrained utility
maximizer)? Given the observed sequence of actions taken by the
enemy’s radar, we consider three problems: (i) Are the enemy
radar’s actions (waveform choice, beam scheduling) consistent
with constrained utility maximization? If so how can we estimate
the cognitive radar’s utility function that is consistent with its
actions. We formulate and solve the problem in terms of the
spectra (eigenvalues) of the state and observation noise covariance
matrices, and the algebraic Riccati equation. (ii) How to construct
a statistical test for detecting a cognitive radar (constrained
utility maximization) when we observe the radar’s actions in
noise or the radar observes our probe signal in noise? We
propose a statistical detector with a tight Type-II error bound.
(iii) How can we optimally probe (interrogate) the enemy’s radar
by choosing our state to minimize the Type-II error of detecting
if the radar is deploying an economic rational strategy, subject
to a constraint on the Type-I detection error? We present a
stochastic optimization algorithm to optimize our probe signal.
The main analysis framework used in this paper is that of
revealed preferences from microeconomics.
Index Terms—revealed preferences, inverse reinforcement
learning, adversarial signal processing, identifying cognitive be-
havior, spectral revealed preferences, Afriat’s theorem, stochas-
tic gradient algorithm, detection, economics-based-rationality,
Kalman filter tracker, algebraic Riccati equation, waveform
selection, beam scheduling
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radars [1] use the perception-action cycle of
cognition to sense the environment, learn from it relevant
information about the target and the background, then adapt
the radar sensor to optimally satisfy the needs of their mission.
A crucial element of a cognitive radar is optimal adaptivity:
based on its tracked estimates, the radar adaptively optimizes
the waveform, aperture, dwell time and revisit rate. In other
words, a cognitive radar is a constrained utility maximizer.
This paper is motivated by the next logical step, namely,
inverse cognitive radar. From the intercepted emissions of an
enemy’s radar: (i) How can we identify if the enemy’s radar
is cognitive? That is, are the enemy radar’s actions consistent
with optimizing a utility function (equivalently, is the radar’s
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behavior rational in an economics sense). If so how to estimate
the cognitive radar’s utility function that is consistent with its
actions? (ii) How to construct a statistical detection test for
utility maximization when we observe the enemy’s radar’s
actions in noise and the enemy radar observes our probe
signal in noise? (iii) How can we optimally probe the enemy’s
radar by choosing our state to minimize the Type-II error of
detecting if the enemy radar is deploying an economic rational
strategy, subject to a constraint on the Type-I detection error?
The central theme of this paper involves an adversar-
ial signal processing/inverse reinforcement learning problem1
comprised of “us” and an “adversary”. Figure 1 displays the
schematic setup. “Us” refers to a drone/UAV or electromag-
netic signal that probes an “adversary” cognitive radar system.
The adversary’s cognitive radar estimates our kinematic coor-
dinates using a Bayesian tracker and then adapts its mode
(waveform, aperture, revisit time) dynamically using feedback
control based on sensing our kinematic state (e.g. position and
velocity of drone). At each time n our kinematic state can be
viewed2 as a probe vector αn ∈ IRm+ to the radar. We observe
the radar’s response βn ∈ IRm. Given the time series of probe
vectors and responses, {(αn, βn), n = 1, . . . , N} is it possible
to say if the radar is “rational” (in an economics-based sense)?
That is, does there exist a utility function U(β) that the radar
is maximizing to generate its response βn to our probe input
αn? How can we estimate such a utility function to predict
the future behavior of the cognitive radar?
A. Revealed Preferences and Afriat’s Theorem
Nonparametric detection of utility maximization behavior
is the central theme in the area of revealed preferences in
microeconomics; which dates back to Samuelson in 1938 [3].
Definition 1 ([4], [5]). A system is a utility maximizer if for
every probe αn ∈ IRm+ , the response βn ∈ IRm satisfies
βn ∈ arg max
α′nβ≤1
U(β) (1)
where U(β) is a monotone utility function.
1Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) [2] seeks to estimate the utility
function of a decision system by observing its input output dataset. The
revealed preferences framework considered here is more general since it
identifies if the behavior is consistent with a utility function and then estimates
a set of utility functions that rationalize the dataset. Also revealed preferences
involves active learning in that the observer probes the system whereas
classical IRL is passive with no probe signal.
2In Section III we give specific examples of how the kinematic state and
radar actions are mapped to probe αn and response βn, respectively.
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Fig. 1: Schematic of Adversarial Inference Problem. Our side
is a drone/UAV or electromagnetic signal that probes the
enemy’s cognitive radar system. k denotes a fast time scale and
n denotes a slow time scale. Our state xk, parameterized by
αn (purposeful acceleration maneuvers), probes the adversary
radar. Based on the noisy observation yk of our state, the
enemy radar responds with action βn. Our aim is to determine
if the enemy radar is economic rational, i.e., is its response
βn generated by constrained optimizing a utility function?
In economics, αn denotes the price vector and βn the
consumption vector. Then α′nβ ≤ 1 is a natural budget
constraint3 for a consumer with 1 dollar. Given a dataset of
price and consumption vectors, the aim is to determine if the
consumer is a utility maximizer (rational) in the sense of (1).
The key result in revealed preferences is the following
remarkable theorem due to Afriat; see [6], [5], [4], [7], [8]
for extensive expositions.
Theorem 2 (Afriat’s Theorem [4]). Given a data set
D = {(αn, βn), n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}}, (2)
the following statements are equivalent:
1) The system is a utility maximizer and there exists a
monotonically increasing,4 continuous, and concave util-
ity function by satisfies (1).
2) For ut and λt > 0 the following set of inequalities (called
Afriat’s inequalities) has a feasible solution:
us−ut−λtα′t(βs−βt) ≤ 0 ∀t, s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. (3)
3) Explicit monotone and concave utility functions that
rationalize the dataset by satisfying (1) are given by:
U(β) = min
t∈{1,2,...,N}
{ut + λtα′t(β − βt)} (4)
where ut and λt satisfy the linear inequalities (3).
4) The data set D satisfies the Generalized Axiom of Re-
vealed Preference (GARP), namely for any t ≤ N ,
α′tβt ≥ α′tβt+1 ∀t ≤ k − 1 =⇒ α′kβk ≤ α′kβ1. (5)
3As discussed below, the budget constraint α′nβ ≤ 1 is without loss of
generality, and can be replaced by α′nβ ≤ c for any positive constant c.
4By definition, an economics-based utility function is monotone increasing,
i.e., β1 ≤ β2 (elementwise) implies U(β1) ≤ U(β2), and we will use
this definition throughout the paper. Monotone is a special case of a more
general class of locally non-satiated utility functions [9]. In this paper, we
use monotone and local non-satiation interchangeably. Afriat’s theorem was
originally stated for a non-satiated utility function.
Afriat’s theorem tests for economics-based rationality; its
remarkable property is that it gives a necessary and sufficient
condition for a system to be a utility maximizer based on
the system’s input-output response. The feasibility of the set
of inequalities (3) can be checked using a linear program-
ming solver; alternatively GARP (5) can be checked using
Warshall’s algorithm with O(N3) computations [10] [11]. A
utility function consistent with the data can be constructed5
using (4).
The recovered utility using (4) is not unique; indeed any
positive monotone increasing transformation of (4) also satis-
fies Afriat’s Theorem; that is, the utility function constructed
is ordinal. This is the reason why the budget constraint
α′nβ ≤ 1 is without loss of generality; it can be scaled by an
arbitrary positive constant and Theorem 2 still holds. In signal
processing terminology, Afriat’s Theorem can be viewed as
set-valued system identification of an argmax system; set-
valued since (4) yields a set of utility functions that rationalize
the finite dataset D.
B. Objectives
In this paper, our working assumption is that a cognitive
radar satisfies economics-based rationality; that is, a cognitive
radar is a constrained utility maximizer in the sense of (4) with
possibly a nonlinear budget constraint. The main objectives of
the paper involve answering:
1. Test for Utility Maximization – Spectral Revealed
Preferences: The first question is: Does a radar satisfy eco-
nomics based rationality, i.e., is its action βn consistent with
optimizing a utility function U? By observing how the enemy’s
radar switches ambiguity function and waveforms to track a
target, or how the radar schedules its beam between targets, is
there a utility function that rationalizes the radar’s behavior?
Notice that a key requirement in Afriat’s theorem is a budget
constraint. How to formulate a useful budget constraint for
a radar? A key idea in this paper is to formulate linear and
nonlinear budget constraints for a radar in terms of the tracking
error covariance where αn and βn are the spectra of the state
and observation noise matrices (as will be justified in Section
III) associated with a Kalman filter tracker. Specifically, the
linear budget constraint is used in Sec.III for waveform design,
and Sec.IV for beam scheduling, while a non-linear budget
constraint is used to formulate utility maximization in terms
of the spectrum of covariance matrices. From a practical point
of view, such spectral revealed preferences yield constructive
estimates of the radar’s utility function, and so we can predict
(in a Bayesian sense) its future actions.
2. Cognition Detection in Noise: If the radar’s response
βn or probe signal αn is observed in noise, then violation of
Afriat’s theorem could be either due to measurement noise
or the absence of utility maximization. We will construct a
statistical detection test to decide if the radar is a utility
5As pointed out in Varian’s influential paper [11], another remarkable
feature of Afriat’s theorem is that if the dataset can be rationalized by a
monotone utility function, then it can be rationalized by a continuous, concave,
monotonic utility function. Put another way, continuity and concavity cannot
be refuted with a finite dataset.
3maximizer. The hypothesis test yields a tight bound for the
Type-I errors.
3. Optimal Probing. Given the detector in the above
objective, what choice of probe signal yields the smallest Type-
II error in detecting if the radar is a utility maximizer, subject
to maintaining the Type-I error within a specified bound? We
construct a stochastic gradient algorithm that estimates our
optimal probe sequence.
C. Context and Literature
The above objectives are fundamentally different to the
model-centric theme used in the signal processing literature
where one postulates an objective function (typically convex)
and then proposes optimization algorithms. In contrast the re-
vealed preference approach is data centric - given a dataset, we
wish to determine if it is consistent with utility maximization.
Specifically, Sections III and IV below discuss how revealed
preferences can be used as a systematic method to identify
utility maximization in cognitive radars.
Regarding the literature, in the context of revealed prefer-
ences we already mentioned [7], [12], [8], [6], [4]. A nonlinear
budget version extension was developed in [13] which we will
exploit in our spectral revealed preferences setup in Section
III. A stochastic detector for utility maximization given noisy
measurements of the probe or response is studied in [14],
[15] and we will use these results in Section V. Our earlier
work [16], [17] consider utility estimation in adversarial signal
processing and social network applications. As mentioned
above, revealed preferences are more general than inverse
reinforcement learning [2].
Cognitive radars [18] use stochastic control and optimal
resource allocation to adapt their waveform [19], beam allo-
cation [20], aperture, and service requests. In the last decade
there have been numerous works in adaptive/cognitive radar
and radar resource management; see [21], [22], [23] and
references therein. What has not been studied is: by listening
to a radar, can one identify if the radar is a utility maximizer,
and if so, estimate its utility function. This is the subject of
our paper. Below we will use revealed preferences to identify
radars that optimize their waveforms and their beam allocation.
Our aim is to give a necessary and sufficient condition to
identify if a radar is cognitive, estimate its utility function,
construct a statistical detector for utility maximization’s when
the radar is observed in noise (or the radar observes us
in noise) and then adaptively optimize our probe signal to
minimize the classification error of the detector. Although not
discussed in this paper, once we can detect cognitive behavior
and estimate the radar’s utility function, we can predict future
actions possibly spoof/jam the radar.
Finally, this paper builds on our recent work [24], [25] in
Bayesian adversarial signal processing where the aim is to
reconstruct the posterior distribution of the enemy’s tracker
given its actions. While [24], [25] deal with inverse Bayesian
estimation problems, the focus here is on the more general
problem of detecting constrained utility maximization in a
non-parametric setting.
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Fig. 2: Interaction of our dynamics with adversary’s cognitive
radar. The cognitive radar is comprised of a Bayesian tracker
and a radar controller. Based on the time series (αn, βn), n =
1, . . . , N , or more generally (αn, β¯n), n = 1, . . . , N , our goal
is to determine of the radar controller is a utility optimizer in
the sense of (1).
II. COGNITIVE RADAR RESPONSE MODEL
The setup involves two time scales. Let k = 1, 2, . . . denote
discrete time (fast time scale) and n = 1, 2, . . . denote epoch
(slow time scale). Our probe signal is αn, the radar’s response
action is βn and our measurement of this action is β¯n.
The model of “us” interacting with the cognitive radar has
the following dynamics, see Figure 2:
our state: xk ∼ pαn(x|xk−1), x0 ∼ pi0
radar action: βn ∈ arg max
α′nβ≤1
U(β)
radar observation: yk ∼ pβn(y|xk)
radar tracker: pik = T (pik−1, yk)
observed action: β¯n = βn + n
(6)
Let us explain the notation in (6): p(·) denotes a generic
conditional probability density function (or probability mass
function), ∼ denotes distributed according to, and
• xk ∈ X is our Markovian state with transition kernel pαn
and prior pi0 where X denotes the state space.
• Our dynamics are determined by the control probe signal
αn which evolves on the slow time scale. Our probing of
the enemy radar is performed via purposeful maneuvers.
We will model αn using two different levels of abstrac-
tion. In Sec.III we use αn to model the state maneuver
noise covariance matrix. In Sec.IV we will work at a
higher level of abstraction and use αn to model the
covariance at the enemy’s Kalman tracker (which is a
deterministic function of the state covariance matrix).
• Based on optimizing a utility function U (which is
unknown to us) of the predicted target statistic (e.g.
covariance of the target’s estimate) in epoch n, the enemy
radar chooses an action βn. It is here that actual tracker
structure determines the response.
• yk ∈ Y is the radar’s noisy observation of our state xk;
with observation likelihoods pβn(y|x). Here Y denote the
observation space.
• The observation at the radar depends on its action βn,
which evolves on the slow time scale. This reflects the
fact that the cognitive radar adapts (optimizes) its receive
and transmit functionalities. For example, it adapts its
matched filter to its transmit waveform.
4• pik = p(xk|y1:k) is the radar tracker’s belief (posterior) of
our state xk where y1:k denotes the sequence y1, . . . , yk.
The tracking functionality T (·) in (6) is the classical
Bayesian optimal filtering update formula [23]
T (pi, y)(x) =
pβ(y|x)
∫
X pα(x|ζ)pi(ζ) dζ∫
X pβ(y|x)
∫
X pα(x|ζ)pi(ζ) dζdx
(7)
Note that the cognitive radar’s tracker update depends
on the both the probe αn and response βn signals. Let
Π denote the space of all such beliefs. When the state
space X is Euclidean space, then Π is a function space
comprising the space of density functions; if X is finite,
then Π is the unit X − 1 dimensional simplex of X-
dimensional probability mass functions.
• β¯n denotes our noisy measurement of the radar’s action
The above model substantially generalizes the adversarial
signal processing model in our recent paper [24] since now
the state, observation and tracker dynamics are controlled by
the probe and response signals. As mentioned earlier, [24]
focused on Bayesian estimation of posterior pik; in comparison
this paper addresses the deeper problem of
1) determining if the radar response signal is consistent with
constrained utility maximization,
2) estimating utility U(β) subject to the signal processing
constraints in (6).
To summarize, a cognitive radar chooses its action to
maximize a utility function, and adapts its receiver to the
optimized action. In terms of Afriat’s theorem, we will use the
following economics-based interpretation: the probe signal αn
is the price the radar pays for tracking our target, while βn
is the amount of resources (consumption) the radar spends on
the target at epoch n. We will justify this price/consumption
framework in economics (budget constraint) terms at two
levels of abstraction: waveform adaptation for a single tar-
get (Sec.III) and beam scheduling amongst multiple targets
(Sec.IV). We will also show how a nonlinear budget constraint
arises in the context of the spectrum of the state covariance
matrix.
Remark. Game-theoretic setting: This paper assumes the
radar responds to our probe in an optimal way. In a more
sophisticated game-theoretic setting, a radar is aware that
we are probing it, and may deliberately use a sub-optimal
response to confuse us. Identifying if our strategy and the
radar’s strategy are consistent with play from the equilibrium
of a game is a difficult problem and not considered here; see
[26] for partial results in the special case of potential games.
III. WAVEFORM ADAPTATION: SPECTRAL REVEALED
PREFERENCES TO TEST FOR COGNITIVE RADAR
Waveform adaptation is perhaps one of the most important
functionalities of a cognitive radar. A cognitive radar adapts
its waveform by adapting its ambiguity function. Our aim is
to identify such cognitive behavior of the enemy’s radar when
it deploys a Bayesian filter as a physical level tracker. For
concreteness, in this section we assume that the enemy’s cog-
nitive radar uses a Kalman filter tracker. Also since the probe
and response signal evolve on a slow time scale n (described
below) we assume that both the radar and us (observer) have
perfect measurements of probe αn and response βn.
Our working assumption is that a cognitive radar satisfies
economics-based rationality; that is, it adapts its waveform
by maximizing a utility function in the sense of (4) with a
possibly nonlinear budget constraint. A key requirement in
Afriat’s Theorem 2 is the budget constraint. In economics,
such a constraint is obvious since it specifies the total available
resources of the decision maker. How to formulate useful
budget constraints for waveform adaptation? Our key idea
here is to formulate linear and nonlinear budget constraints in
terms of the Kalman filter error covariance where αn and βn
are the spectra (eigenvalues) of the state and covariance noise
matrices of the state space model.
A. Waveform Adaptation by Cognitive Radar
Suppose a radar adapts its waveform while tracking a
target (us) using a Kalman filter. Our probe input comprises
purposeful maneuvers that modulate the spectrum (vector of
eigenvalues) of the state noise covariance matrix. The radar
responds with an optimized waveform which modulates the
spectrum of the observation noise covariance matrix. By
observing the radar’s signals, how can we test the radar for
economic rationality?
1) Linear Gaussian Target Model and Radar Tracker:
Linear Gaussian dynamics for a target’s kinematics [27] and
linear Gaussian measurements at the radar are widely assumed
as a useful approximation [28]. Accordingly, consider the
following special case of model (6) with linear Gaussian
dynamics and measurements:
xk+1 = Axk + wk(αn), x0 ∼ pi0
yk = C xk + vk(βn)
(8)
Here xk ∈ X = IRX is “our” state with initial density
pi0 ∼ N(xˆ0,Σ0), yk ∈ Y = IRY denotes the cognitive
radar’s observations, wk ∼ N(0, Q(αn)), vk ∼ N(0, R(βn))
and {wk}, {vk} are mutually independent i.i.d. processes.
When xk denotes respectively, the x,y,z position and velocity
components of the target (so xk ∈ IR6) then
A6×6 = diag
[[1 T
0 1
]
,
[
1 T
0 1
]
,
[
1 T
0 1
]]
(9)
where T is the sampling interval. Recall k indexes the fast
time scale while n indexes the slow time scale.
In (8) we explicitly indicate the dependence of the state
noise covariance Q on our probe signal αn and the observation
noise covariance R on the radar’s response signal βn. These
are justified as follows. When the radar controls its ambiguity
function, in effect it controls the measurement noise covariance
R. Of course, this come as a cost: reducing the observation
noise covariance of a target results in increased visibility of
the radar (and therefore higher threat) or increased covariance
of other targets. Note that the radar re-configures its receiver
(matched filter) each time it chooses a waveform; (8) abstracts
all the physical layer aspects of the radar response into the
observation noise covariance R(βn).
5Our probing of the enemy radar is performed via purposeful
maneuvers by modulating our state covariance matrix Q in (8)
by αn. For example, in a classical linear Gaussian state space
model used in target tracking [28], our probe αn parametrizes
the state noise covariance Q(αn) which models acceleration
maneuvers of our drone.
Based on observation sequence y1, . . . , yk, the tracking
functionality in the radar computes the posterior
pik = N(xˆk,Σk)
where xˆk is the conditional mean state estimate and Σk is the
covariance. These are computed by the classical Kalman filter:
Σk+1|k = AΣkA′ +Q(αn)
Kk+1 = CΣk+1|kC ′ +R(βn)
xˆk+1 = A xˆk + Σk+1|kC ′K
−1
k+1(yk+1 − C A xˆk)
Σk+1 = Σk+1|k − Σk+1|kC ′K−1k+1CΣk+1|k
(10)
Under the assumption that the model parameters in (8) satisfy
[A,C] is detectable and [A,
√
Q] is stabilizable, the asymptotic
predicted covariance Σk+1k|k as k → ∞ is the unique non-
negative definite solution of the algebraic Riccati equation
(ARE):
A(α, β,Σ) defn=
−Σ +A(Σ−ΣC ′ [CΣC ′ +R(β)]−1 CΣ)A′ +Q(α) = 0
(11)
where αn and βn are the probe and response signals of the
radar at epoch n. Note A(α, β,Σ) is a symmetric IRm×m
matrix. Since Σ is parametrized by α, β, we write the solution
of the ARE at epoch n as Σ∗n(α, β).
B. Effect of waveform design on observation noise covariance
To give a precise structure to the radar dynamics, this
section summarizes how the observation noise covariance
R(β) in (8) depends on the radar waveform. The details
involve maximum likelihood estimation involving the radar
ambiguity function and can be found in [29], [19]. Below:
• c denotes the speed of light (in free space),
• ωc denotes the carrier frequency,
• θ is an adjustable parameter in the waveform,
• η is the signal to noise ratio at the radar.
• j =
√−1 is the unit imaginary number.
• s˜(t) is the complex envelope of the waveform.
• β is the vector of eigenvalues of R (in Section III-D
below) or R−1 (in Section III-C below).
We now describe 3 waveforms and their resulting observa-
tion noise covariance matrices R(β); see [19] for details.
(i) Triangular Pulse - Continuous Wave
s˜(t) =
{ √
3
2θ
(
1− |t|θ
)
−θ < t < θ
0 otherwise
R(β) =
[
c2θ2
12η 0
0 5c
2
2ω2cθ
2η
] (12)
(ii) Gaussian Pulse - Continuous Wave
s˜(t) =
(
1
piθ2
)1/4
exp
(−t2
2θ2
)
R(β) =
[
c2θ2
2η 0
0 c
2
2ω2cθ
2η
] (13)
(iii) Gaussian Pulse - Linear Frequency Modulation chirp
s˜(t) =
(
1
piθ21
)1/4
exp
(
−
(
1
2θ21
− jθ2
)
t2
)
R(β) =
 c2θ212η −c2θ2θ21ωcη−c2θ2θ21
ωcη
c2
ω2cη
(
1
2θ21
+ 2θ22θ
2
1
)  (14)
To summarize, by adapting its waveform parametrized by
β (vector of eigenvalues), the radar can change the noise
covariance R(β). Below we will use the response βn to
construct revealed preference tests for cognition.
C. Testing for Cognitive Radar: Spectral Revealed Preferences
with Linear Budget
We now show that Afriat’s theorem (Theorem 2) can be
used to determine if a radar is cognitive. The assumption
here is that the utility function U(β) maximized by the radar
is a monotone function (unknown to us) of the predicted
covariance of the target. Our main task is to formulate and
justify a linear budget constraint α′nβ ≤ 1 in Afriat’s theorem.
Specifically, suppose
1) Our probe αn that characterizes our maneuvers, is the
vector of eigenvalues of the positive definite matrix Q
2) The radar response βn is the vector of eigenvalues of the
positive definite matrix R−1.
Then the cognitive radar chooses its waveform parameter βn
at each slow time epoch n to maximize a utility U(·):
βn ∈ arg max
α′nβ≤1
U(β) (15)
where U is a monotone increasing function of β.
Then Afriat’s theorem (Theorem 2) can be used to detect
utility maximization and construct a utility function that ra-
tionalizes the response of the radar. Recall that the 1 in the
right hand side of the budget α′nβ ≤ 1 can be replaced by any
non-negative constant.
It only remains to justify the linear budget constraint α′nβ ≤
1 in (15). The i-th component of α, denoted as α(i), is the
incentive for considering the i-th mode of the target; α(i) is
proportional to the signal power. The i-th component of β is
the amount of resources (energy) devoted by the radar to this
i-th mode; a higher β(i) (more resources) results in a smaller
measurement noise covariance, resulting in higher accuracy
of measurement by the radar. So α′nβ measures the signal to
noise ratio (SNR) and the budget constraint α′nβ ≤ 1 is a
bound on the SNR. A rational radar maximizes a utility U(β)
that is monotone increasing in the accuracy (inverse of noise
power) β. However, the radar has limited resources and can
only expend sufficient resources to ensure that the precision
(inverse covariance) of all modes is at most some pre-specified
6precision Σ¯−1 at each epoch n. We can then justify the linear
budget constraint as follows:
Lemma 3. The linear budget constraint α′nβ ≤ 1 implies
that solution of the ARE (11) satisfies Σ∗n
−1(αn, β)  Σ¯−1
for some symmetric positive definite matrix Σ¯−1.
The proof of Lemma 3 follows straightforwardly using the
information Kalman filter formulation [30], and showing that
Σ∗−1 is increasing in β. Afriat’s theorem requires that the
constraint α′nβ ≤ 1 is active at β = βn. This holds in our
case since Σ∗−1 is increasing in β.
To summarize, we can use Afriat’s theorem (Theorem 2)
with αn as the spectrum of Q and βn as the spectrum of R, to
test a cognitive radar for utility maximization (15). Moreover,
Afriat’s theorem constructs a set of utility functions (4) that
rationalize the decisions of the radar.
D. Testing for Cognitive Radar: Spectral Revealed Prefer-
ences with Nonlinear Budget Constraint
This section constructs a method to identify cognitive
radars by generalizing Afriat’s theorem to a nonlinear budget
constraint. The nonlinear budget constraint (nonlinear in β)
emerges naturally from the covariance of the Kalman filter
tracker, namely, the ARE (11). We use this together with
an extension of Afriat’s theorem to test if a radar satisfies
economic rationality. The interpretation of the probe and
response are different (in some sense “opposite”) to that of
the linear case:
1) The probe vector αn ∈ IRm is the vector of eigenvalues
of Q−1.
2) The radar response βn ∈ IRm+ is the vector of eigenvalues
of R.
3) Define λ(Σ∗n(αn, β)) as the largest eigenvalue of
Σ∗n(αn, β) where Σ
∗ is the solution of the ARE (11).
With the above definitions, our aim is to test if the radar’s
response β satisfies economics-rationality:
βn = arg max
β
U(β),
subject to: λ
(
Σ∗n(αn, β)
) ≤ λ¯, β ≤ β¯n (16)
Since there is no natural ordering of eigenvalues, our assump-
tion is that U(β) is a symmetric function6 of β. Here Σ∗n is the
solution of the ARE (11) at epoch n, and λ¯ ∈ IR+, β¯n ∈ IRm+
are user-specified parameters. Note that the constraint β ≤ β¯n
holds elementwise.
1) Economics-based Rationale for Utility and Nonlinear
Budget constraint (16): The economics-based rationale for the
utility (16) is as follows: The i-th component of α, denoted as
α(i), is the price the radar pays for devoting resources to the
i-th mode of the target. Since α(i) is inversely proportional to
the signal power; so a higher α(i) implies a more expensive
mode to track, implying that the enemy radar needs to allocate
more resources to the i-th mode. The radar’s response for the
6Examples of symmetric functions include trace, determinant, nuclear norm,
etc. The assumption of symmetry is only required when we choose β to be
the vector of eigenvalues since there is no natural ordering of the eigenvalues
in terms of the ordering of the elements of the matrix. Specifically, Theorem 5
does not require U(β) to be a symmetric function of β.
i-th mode is β(i); this reflects the cost incurred by the radar for
estimating mode i. A rational radar aims to minimize its total
effort C(β) where cost C(β) decreases with β since choosing
a waveform that results in a larger observation noise variance
requires less effort. Equivalently, the radar seeks to maximize
a utility function U(β) = −C(β) where U(β) is increasing
with β.
We now discuss the nonlinear budget constraint
λ
(
Σ∗n(αn, β)
) ≤ λ¯ in (16) together with β ≤ β¯n. The
radar seeks to minimize total effort C(β) subject to
maintaining the inaccuracy of all modes (covariance Σn) to
be smaller than some pre-specified covariance Σ¯. Clearly,
a sufficient condition is that λ
(
Σ∗n(αn, β)
) ≤ λ¯. But
for revealed preferences involving nonlinear budgets, we
need the following (see Theorem 5 below): The constraint
λ
(
Σ∗n(αn, β)
) ≤ λ¯ in (16) needs to be active at βn. This is
straightforwardly ensured by choosing λ¯ as
λ¯ ∈ [0, λL], where λL = λ(Σ∗n(αn, β¯n)) (17)
That is, λL is the largest eigenvalue of the unique solution
ΣL of the ARE A(αn, β¯n,Σ) = 0. The constraint (17)
says that the enemy’s Bayesian tracker cannot perform worse
in covariance than that of the worst case observation noise
covariance R(β¯). i.e., Σ∗ ≤ ΣL (positive definite ordering).
Remark. In the special case when the constraint β ≤ β¯ is
omitted, then ΣL is the solution of the algebraic Lyapunov
equation
Σ = AΣA′ +Q(α) (18)
The constraint (17) then says that the enemy’s Bayesian tracker
cannot perform worse than the optimal predictor (which has
infinite observation noise). Of course, when A is specified as
in (9), since all the eigenvalues of A are 1, the solution of the
algebraic Lyapunov equation is not finite.
We can now justify the nonlinear budget for a cognitive
radar equipped with a Kalman filter tracker as follows:
Lemma 4. Consider the nonlinear budget constraint
λ
(
Σ∗n(αn, β)
) ≤ λ¯ in (16) with user defined parameter λ¯
satisfying (17). Then the solution of the ARE (11) satisfies
Σ∗n(αn, β)  Σ¯, for any choice of symmetric positive definite
matrix Σ¯  ΣL.
2) Revealed Preference for Nonlinear Budget: Hav-
ing formally justified the nonlinear budget constraint
λ
(
Σ∗n(αn, β)
) ≤ λ¯ in (16), we now state the main revealed
preference test [13] which generalizes Afriat’s theorem to
nonlinear budgets. The result below provides an explicit test
for a cognitive radar and constructs a set of utility functions
that rationalizes the decisions {βn} of the cognitive radar.
Theorem 5 (Test for rationality with nonlinear budget [13]).
Let Bn = {β ∈ IRm+ |gn(β) ≤ 0} with gn : IRm → IR
an increasing, continuous function and gn(βn) = 0 for
n = 1, . . . , N . Then the following conditions are equivalent:
1) There exists a monotone continuous utility function U that
rationalizes the data set {βn, Bn}, n = 1, . . . , N . That is
βn = arg max
β
U(β), gn(βn) ≤ 0
72) The data set {βn, Bn}, n = 1, . . . , N satisfies GARP:
gt(βj) ≤ gt(βt) =⇒ gj(βt) ≥ 0
3) For ut and λt > 0 the following set of inequalities has a
feasible solution:
us − ut − λtgt(βs) ≤ 0 ∀t, s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. (19)
4) With ut and λt defined in (19), an explicit monotone
continuous utility function that rationalizes the data set
is given by:
U(β) = min
t∈{1,2,...,N}
{ut + λt gt(β)} (20)
Remarks: (i) Clearly Afriat’s theorem (Theorem 2) is a
special case of Theorem 5 where gn(β) = α′n(β − βn). But
unlike Afriat’s theorem, the constructed utility function is not
necessarily concave.
(ii) Just like Afriat’s theorem, (19) comprises of linear in-
equalities in ut, λt. So feasibility can be checked using an LP
solver.
We now show that the nonlinear radar budget constraint in
(16), (17) satisfies the properties of Theorem 5 with
gn(β) = λ
(
Σ∗n(αn, β)
)− λ¯ (21)
First, clearly Σ∗(α, β) is increasing in β and is a continuous
function of β, and so is λ
(
Σ∗(α, β)
)
. Second Theorem 5
requires the constraint to be active at βn. This follows since
λ
(
Σ∗n(αn, β)
)
is increasing in β and due to (17).
Summary: By choosing the probe signal α as the spectrum
of Q−1 and the response signal β as the spectrum of R, we
can use the nonlinear budget Theorem 5 to test a cognitive
radar for utility maximization. We can then construct explicit
utility functions (20) that rationalize the decisions of the radar
in terms of waveform adaptation.
IV. BEAM ALLOCATION: REVEALED PREFERENCE TEST
This section constructs a test for cognitivity of a radar that
switches its beam adaptively between targets. We work at
a higher level of abstraction than the previous section and
consider multiple targets. At this higher level of abstraction,
we view each component i of the probe signal αn(i) as the
trace of the precision matrix (inverse covariance) of target
i. Note that the precision matrix is a deterministic function
of the maneuver covariance of target i, and in the previous
subsection we used this maneuver covariance as the probe
signal. In comparison, we now use the trace of the precision
of each target in our probe signal – this allows us to consider
multiple targets.
Suppose a radar adaptively switches its beam between m
targets where these m targets are controlled by us. As in
(8), on the fast time scale indexed by k, each target i has
linear Gaussian dynamics and the enemy radar obtains linear
Gaussian measurements:
xik+1 = Ax
i
k + w
i
k, x0 ∼ pi0
yik = C x
i
k + v
i
k, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
(22)
Here wik ∼ N(0, Qn(i)), vik ∼ N(0, Rn(i)). We assume that
both Qn(i) and Rn(i) are known to us and the enemy.
As in previous sections, n indexes the slow time scale and
k indexes the fast time scale. The enemy’s radar tracks our m
targets using Kalman filter trackers. The fraction of time the
radar allocates to each target i in epoch n is βn(i). The price
the radar pays for each target i at the beginning of epoch n
is the trace of the predicted precision of target i. Recall that
this is the trace of the inverse of the predicted covariance at
epoch n using the Kalman predictor7
αn(i) = Tr(Σ
−1
n|n−1(i)), i = 1, . . . ,m (23)
The predicted covariance Σn|n−1(i) is a deterministic function
of the maneuver covariance Qn(i) of target i. So the probe
αn(i) is a signal that we can choose, since it is a deterministic
function of the maneuver covariance Qn(i) of target i. Unlike
the previous section where the spectrum of the probe matrix
was chosen as the probe vector, here we abstract the target’s
covariance by the trace αn(i). Note also that the observation
noise covariance Rin depends on the enemy’s radar response
βn(i), i.e., the fraction of time allocated to target i. We assume
that each target i is equipped with a radar detector and can
estimate8 the fraction of time βn(i) the enemy’s radar devotes
to it.
Given the time series αn, βn, n = 1, . . . , N , our aim is
to detect if the enemy’s radar is cognitive. We assume that a
cognitive radar optimizes its beam allocation as follows:
βn = arg max
β
U(β)
s.t. β′αn ≤ p∗,
(24)
where U(·) is the enemy radar’s utility function (unknown to
us) and p∗ ∈ IR+ is a pre-specified average precision of all m
targets.
The economics-based rationale for the budget constraint is
natural: For targets that are cheaper (lower precision αn(i)),
the radar has incentive to devote more time βn(i). However,
given its resource constraints, the radar can achieve at most
an average precision of p∗ over all targets.
Note that the setup (24) is directly amenable to Afriat’s
Theorem 2. Thus (3) can be used to test if the radar satisfies
utility maximization in its beam scheduling (24) and also
estimate the set of utility functions (4). Furthermore (as in
Afriat’s theorem) since the utility is ordinal, p∗ can be chosen
as 1 without loss of generality (and therefore does not need
to be known by us).
V. DETECTING COGNITIVE RADARS IN A NOISY SETTING
Thus far we have discussed revealed preference based
methods to identify cognitive radars when the radar response
is measured perfectly by us. Afriat’s theorem (Theorem 2) and
its generalization to nonlinear budgets (Theorem 5) assumes
perfect observation of the probe and response. However, when
the response (e.g. enemy’s radar waveform) is measured in
noise by us, or the probe signal (e.g. our maneuver) is
7Since A has all its eigenvalues at 1, we cannot use the algebraic Lyapunov
equation (18) as it does not have bounded solution.
8If we impose a probabilistic structure on the estimates, then the resulting
problem of statistical detection of a utility maximizer (stochastic revealed
preferences) is discussed in Section V.
8measured in noise by the enemy, violation of the inequalities
in Afriat Theorem could be either due to measurement noise
or absence of utility maximization (economic rationality). In
this section we give two statistical detection tests for utility
maximization and characterize the Type-I and Type-II errors
of the detector. We give the tightest possible Type-I error
bound. This section also sets the stage for Sec.VI where the
probe signal is optimizes to minimize the Type-II error of the
detector.
A. Detecting Cognitive Radar given Noisy Response
Suppose we observe the response βn of the enemy’s radar
in additive noise n as
β¯n = βn + n. (25)
Here n are m-dimensional random variables that are possibly
correlated but functionally independent of βn. As an example,
consider the setup of Section IV where a cognitive radar
allocates its beam between multiple targets. Each target i
equipped with a radar detector obtains a noisy estimate of
the fraction of time βn(i) the enemy radar devotes to it.
Given the noisy data set
Dobs =
{(
αn, β¯n
)
: n ∈ {1, . . . , N}} , (26)
from the enemy radar, how can we detect if is cognitive? Let
• H0 denote the null hypothesis that the data set Dobs
in (26) satisfies utility maximization.
• H1 denote the alternative hypothesis that the data set does
not satisfy utility maximization.
There are two possible sources of error:
Type-I errors: Reject H0 when H0 is valid.
Type-II errors: Accept H0 when H0 is invalid. (27)
Given Dobs, we propose the following statistical test to deter-
mine if the enemy radar is a utility maximizer (1):
+∞∫
Φ∗(β¯)
fM (ψ)dψ
H0
≷
H1
γ . (28)
In the statistical test (28):
(i) γ is the “significance level” of the test.
(ii) The “test statistic” Φ∗(β¯), with β¯ =
[
β¯1, β¯2, . . . , β¯N
]
is
the solution of the following constrained optimization prob-
lem:
min Φ
s.t. us − ut − λtα′t(β¯s − β¯t)− λtΦ ≤ 0
λt > 0 Φ ≥ 0 for t, s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}.
(29)
(iii) fM is the pdf of the random variable M where
M , max
t,s
t 6=s
[α′t(t − s)] . (30)
The intuition behind (28), (29) is clear: if Φ = 0, then (29)
is equivalent to Afriat’s theorem. Due to presence of noise, it
is unlikely that Φ = 0 is feasible; so we seek the minimum
perturbation Φ∗(β¯) that satisfies (29).
The constrained optimization problem (29) is non-convex
due to the bilinear constraints λtΦ. However, since the objec-
tive function depends only on the scalar Φ, a one dimensional
line search algorithm can be used. In particular, for any fixed
value of Φ, (29) becomes a set of linear inequalities, and so
feasibility is straightforwardly determined.
The numerical implementation of detector (28) for a given
probe sequence α = [α1, . . . , αN ] is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Detecting Utility Optimizer given noisy response
1) Offline Step. For iterations l = 1, . . . L:
a) Simulate noise sequence (l) = [1, . . . , N ](l).
b) Compute M (l) using (30).
Compute the empirical distribution FˆM (·) of M from
these L samples.
2) Record the response β¯ from the radar to our probe α.
3) Solve (29) for Φ. Finally implement detector (28) as
1− FˆM (Φ∗(β¯))
H0
≷
H1
γ (31)
Note that Step 1 of Algorithm 1 is offline; it evaluates the
empirical cdf FˆM . Step 2 records the noisy response β¯ of the
radar to our probe and finally Step 3 implements the detector
with significance level γ.
The following theorem is our main result for characterizing
the detector (28). It states that the probability of Type-I error
(false alarm) of the detector is bounded by γ and that the
optimal solution Φ∗(β¯) gives the tightest false alarm bound.
Theorem 6. Consider the noisy data set (26) where β¯ =[
β¯1, β¯2, . . . , β¯N
]
and detector (28).
1) Suppose (29) has a feasible solution. Then H0 is equiv-
alent to the event that Φ∗(β¯) ≤M in (29).
2) The probability of Type-I error (false alarm) is
PΦ∗(β¯)(H1|H0) ≤ γ (32)
3) The optimizer Φ∗(β¯) in (28) yields the tightest Type-I
error bound, in that for any other Φ˜ ∈ [Φ∗,M ],
PΦ˜(β¯)(H1|H0) ≥ PΦ∗(β¯)(H1|H0). (33)
Proof. Suppose H0 holds. By. Theorem 2, H0 is equivalent to
(3) having a feasible solution. Let (λot , u
o
t ) denote a feasible
solution for (3). Then substituting βn = β¯n − n, it is easily
seen that (λot , u
o
t ,Φ = M) is a feasible solution for the noisy
inequalities (29). Since (λot , u
o
t ,Φ = M) is feasible, clearly the
minimizing solution of (29) satisfies Φ∗(β¯) ≤M . Therefore,
(29) feasible and H0 =⇒ Φ∗(β¯) ≤M
Similarly, let (λ¯t, u¯t) denote a feasible solution to the noisy
inequalities (29). Then Φ∗(β¯) ≤ M implies that (3) has a
feasible solution, i.e.,
(29) feasible and Φ∗(β¯) ≤M =⇒ H0
Therefore if (29) is feasible, H0 is equivalent to Φ∗(β¯) ≤M .
Let F¯M denote the complementary cdf of M . From the
statistical test (28), the event H1 given H0 is equivalent to
the event {F¯M (Φ∗(β¯)) ≤ γ} given {Φ∗(β¯) ≤ M} and (29).
9So P (H1|H0) = P (F¯M (Φ∗(β¯)) ≤ γ|Φ∗(β¯) ≤ M). Now if
Φ∗(β¯) = M , then since F¯M (M) is uniform9 in [0, 1] clearly
P (H1|H0) = γ. So if Φ∗(β¯) ≤ M then P (F¯M (Φ∗(β¯)) ≤
γ|Φ∗(β¯) ≤M) ≤ γ, i.e., (32) holds.
Suppose Φ˜(β¯) > Φ∗(β¯). Then clearly, P (F¯M (Φ˜(β¯)) ≤
γ|Φ˜(β¯) ≤ M) ≥ P (F¯M (Φ∗(β¯)) ≤ γ|Φ∗(β¯) ≤ M), i.e., (33)
holds.
B. Detecting Cognitive Radar given Noisy Probe
Here we consider the case where the radar observes our
probe signal αn in additive noise ζn as
α¯n = αn + ζn. (34)
Here ζn are m-dimensional i.i.d. random variables. Note that
(34) is equivalent to the radar input being αn and us observing
the radar input in noise as α¯n.
Given the noisy data set
Dobs = {(α¯n, βn) : n ∈ {1, . . . , N}} , (35)
we propose the following statistical test for testing utility
maximization (1) of the radar:
+∞∫
Φ∗(α¯)
fM (ψ)dψ
H0
≷
H1
γ . (36)
In the statistical test (36):
(i) γ is the “significance level” of the test.
(ii) The test statistic Φ∗(α¯), with α¯ = [α¯1, α¯2, . . . , α¯N ] is the
solution of the following constrained optimization problem:
min Φ
s.t. us − ut − λtα¯′t(βs − βt)− λtΦ ≤ 0
λt > 0 Φ ≥ 0 for t, s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}.
(37)
(iii) fM is the pdf of the random variable M where
M , max
t,s
t 6=s
[ζ ′t(βt − βs)] . (38)
The numerical implementation of the detector (36) for a given
response β = [β1, . . . , βN ] is described in Algorithm 2.
In complete analogy to Theorem 6 we have the following
Type-I error bound for the detector in Algorithm 2.
Theorem 7. Consider the noisy data set (35) and statistical
detector (36), (37). Then the assertions of Theorem 6 hold.
C. Lower bound for False Alarm Probability
Given the significance level of the statistical test in (28), a
Monte Carlo simulation is required to compute the threshold.
We now present an analytical expression for a lower bound on
the false alarm probability of the statistical test in (28) when
the additive noise n in (25) are standard normal variables.
Theorem 8 ([17]). Consider the noisy data set Dobs in (26).
Suppose {n} in (25) are i.i.d N(0, I) Gaussian vectors and
9Obviously the cdf and complementary cdf of any random variable X ,
namely, F (X) and F¯M (X), are uniformly distributed in [0, 1]
Algorithm 2 Detecting Utility Optimizer when Utility Opti-
mizer views our probe signal in noise
1) Offline Step. For iterations l = 1, . . . L:
a) Simulate noise sequence ζ(l) = [ζ1, . . . , ζN ](l).
b) Compute M (l) using (38).
Compute the empirical distribution FˆM (·) of M from
these L samples.
2) Record the response β from the radar to our noisy
probe α¯.
3) Solve (37) for Φ. Finally implement detector (36) as
1− FˆM (Φ∗(α¯))
H0
≷
H1
γ (39)
β¯ =
[
β¯1, β¯2, . . . , β¯N
]
. Then the probability of false alarm
in (27) is lower bounded by
1−
∏
n
1−
√
2
pi
√
2‖αn‖2 exp (−Φ∗(β¯)2/4‖αn‖2)
Φ∗(β¯) +
√
Φ∗(β¯)2 + 8‖αn‖2
 .
(40)
The proof is in [17]. From the analytical expression (40),
we can obtain an upper bound of the test statistic, denoted by
Φ∗(β¯). Hence, given a data set Dobs in (26), if the solution
to the optimization problem (29) is such that Φ > Φ∗(β¯),
then the conclusion is that the data set does not satisfy utility
maximization, for the desired false alarm probability.
Remark. We have discussed detecting a cognitive radar
when either the radar’s response is observed in noise or our
probe vector to the radar is observed in noise. A more general
framework would be where both probe and response were
observed in noise. We are unable to analyze the detector in
this case.
VI. ADAPTIVE OPTIMIZATION OF PROBE SIGNAL TO
MINIMIZE TYPE-II DETECTION ERROR PROBABILITY
This section deals with adaptively interrogating the en-
emy radar to detect if it is cognitive, based on noisy
measurements of the radar’s response. Specifically, given
batches of noisy measurements of the enemy’s radar response
β¯k = [β¯1,k, . . . , β¯N,k], k = 1, 2, . . . (see (25)) how can
we adaptively design batches of our probe signals αk =
[α1,k, . . . , αN,k], k = 1, . . . , so as to minimize the Type-II
error (deciding that the radar is cognitive when it is not)?
Theorem 6 above guarantees that if we observe the radar
response in noise, then the probability of Type-I errors (de-
ciding that the radar is not cognitive when it is) is less
then γ for the decision test (28). Our aim is to enhance the
statistical test (28) by adaptively choosing the probe vectors
α = [α1, α2, . . . , αN ] to reduce the probability of Type-II
errors (deciding that the radar is cognitive when it is not).
The framework is shown in Figure 3 and can be viewed as
a form of active inverse reinforcement learning.
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Fig. 3: Optimizing the probe waveform to detect cognition in
adversary’s radar by minimizing the Type-II errors subject to
constraints in Type-I errors.
The probe signals α are adapted to estimate
arg min
α∈IRm×N+
J(α) = P
( +∞∫
Φ∗
(
β(α)+
)fM (ψ)dψ > γ
∣∣{α,β(α)} ∈ A)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Probability of Type-II error
.
(41)
Here P(· · · |·) denotes the conditional probability that the
statistical test (28) accepts H0, defined in (27), given that
H0 is false. In (41), the noise matrix  = [1, 2, . . . , N ]
where the random vectors n are defined in (25), and γ is the
significance level of (28). The set A contains all the elements
{α,β(α)}, with β(α) = [β1, β2, . . . , βN ], where {α,β} does
not satisfy (5).
Since the probability density function fM defined in (30)
is not known explicitly, (41) is a simulation based stochastic
optimization problem. To determine a local minimum value
of the Type-II error probability J(α) wrt α, several types
of stochastic optimization algorithms can be used [31]. Algo-
rithm 3 uses the simultaneous perturbation stochastic gradient
(SPSA) algorithm:
For the reader who is familiar with adaptive filtering algo-
rithms, the SPSA can be viewed as a generalization where an
explicit formula for the gradient is not available and needs
to be estimated by stochastic simulation. A useful property of
the SPSA algorithm is that estimating the gradient ∇αJk(αk)
in (43) requires only two measurements of the cost function
(42) corrupted by noise per iteration, i.e., the number of
evaluations is independent of the dimension m × N of the
vector α. In comparison, a naive finite difference gradient
estimator requires computing 2(α ×N) estimates of the cost
per iteration; see [31] for a tutorial exposition of the SPSA
algorithm. For decreasing step size µ = 1/k, the SPSA
algorithm converges with probability one to a local stationary
point. For constant step size µ, it converges weakly [32].
VII. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
This section presents four classes of numerical examples to
illustrate the key results of the paper.
A. Spectral Revealed Preferences with Linear Budget
We illustrate identification of a cognitive radar that opti-
mizes its waveform subject to linear budget constraint (15); see
Algorithm 3 SPSA for Minimizing Type-II Error Probability
Step 1. Choose initial probe α0 = [α1, α2, . . . , αN ] ∈ IRm×n+
Step 2. For iterations k = 1, 2, 3, . . .
a) Estimate empirical Type-II error probability J(αk) in
(41) using S independent trials:
Jˆk(αk) =
1
S
S∑
s=1
1
(
FˆM (Φ
∗(β¯s)) ≤ 1− γ
)
(42)
Here, in each trial β¯s is the noisy measurement of
the radar response to our probe vector αk, see (25).
Also 1(·) is the indicator function. FˆM (Φ∗(β¯s)) is the
empirical cdf of M computed as in (31). Φ∗(β¯s) is
obtained from (29) using noisy observation sequence
β¯s where s is a fixed realization of , and data set
{αk,β(αk)} ∈ A, described below (41).
b) Compute the gradient estimate ∇ˆα
∇ˆαJˆk(αk) = Jˆk(αk + ∆kω)− Jˆk(αk −∆kω)
2ω∆k
(43)
∆k(i) =
{
−1 with probability 0.5
+1 with probability 0.5
with gradient step size ω > 0.
c) Update the probe vector αk with step size µ > 0:
αk+1 = αk − µ∇ˆαJˆk(αk).
Sec.III-C for detailed motivation. For easy visualization, we
chose m = 2 (dimension of probe signal) so that the estimated
utility function can be displayed on a 2-d contour plot.
The elements of our probe signal αn are generated randomly
and independently over time n as αn(1) ∼ Unif(0.1, 1.1)
and αn(2) ∼ Unif(0.1, 1.1) where Unif(a, b) denotes uniform
pdf with support (a, b). Recall our probe signal specifies the
diagonal state covariance matrix Qn = diag[αn(1), αn(2)]
in (8).
In response to our probe vector sequence {αn, n =
1, . . . , 50}, suppose the radar chooses its waveform parameters
(e.g., triangular waveform parameters in (12) or Gaussian
pulse parameters in (13)) as
βn = arg max
β
U(β) = det(R−1(β)) = β(1)× β(2)
subject to linear budget constraint (15), namely α′nβ ≤ 1.
Given the dataset D = {(αn, βn), n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 50}},
how to detect if the radar is a constrained utility maximizer
(cognitive)? We verified that Afriat’s inequalities (3) have a
feasible solution implying that the radar’s response is consis-
tent with utility maximization. Also the set of utility functions
consistent with D can be reconstructed via (4). Figure 4a
shows the contours of one such utility function that rationalizes
the dataset D.
It is instructive to compare the response of the radar when it
maximizes other utility functions instead of the determinant.
We chose U(β) = Tr(R−1(β)) For the same probe inputs
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as above, and the corresponding radar response, we verified
that Afriat’s inequalities have a feasible solution, implying that
the radar is a utility maximizer. Figure 4b shows the contours
of one such estimated utility function which rationalizes the
radar’s input output dataset. As expected, the radar’s response
is aligned with the axes since it chooses as much as possible
of the cheapest option. Also the recovered utility is linear
(the contours are lines). Finally, we choose the Cobb-Douglas
utility U(β) =
√
β(1)β(2). Figure 4c shows the contours
of one such estimated utility function which rationalizes the
radar’s input output dataset.
Remarks. (i) Note that the utility U(β) = det(R−1(β)) =
β(1) × β(2) is not a concave function of (β(1), β(2)). It
is important to point out that Afriat’s Theorem 2 makes no
assumption on concavity of the utility. Yet Afriat’s theorem
guarantees that the reconstructed utility function which
rationalizes the data is concave; see also Footnote 5 in
Sec.I-A.
(ii) We also verified that if the radar response βn is chosen as
an independent random sequence, then as might be expected,
the radar does not satisfy the utility maximization test with
high probability.
B. Spectral Revealed Preferences with Nonlinear Budget
We now illustrate identifying a cognitive radar that opti-
mizes its waveform subject to nonlinear budget constraint (16);
see Sec.III-D for detailed motivation. The probe vectors were
generated as in Sec.VII-A, but recall from Sec.III-D that now
Q−1n = diag(αn)). In response to probe αn, the radar chooses
its waveform by choosing βn that maximizes det(R(β)) =
β(1)× β(2) subject to nonlinear budget constraint (16).
The physical parameters for the state space model (8) used
by the radar’s tracker and ARE (11): A =
[
1 1
0 1
]
, C = I2×2.
We chose the nonlinear budget constraint parameters that
specify (16) as β¯n =
[
10 10
]′
and λ¯ = 3.6.
Given the dataset D = {(αn, βn), n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 50}},
we verified that the linear inequalities (19) of Theorem 5
have a feasible solution. Therefore, the radar’s response is
consistent with utility maximization with a nonlinear budget.
Also the set of utility functions consistent with dataset D were
reconstructed via (20). Figure 5 shows the contours of one such
utility function that rationalizes the dataset D.
C. Beam Allocation. Detecting Cognitive Radar in Noise
Here we illustrate the statistical detectors Algorithm 1
and Algorithm 2 described in Sec.V where the response of
the radar is observed in noise and the radar observes our
probe signal in noise. We consider the setup of Sec.IV where
a radar switches its beam between m = 3 targets over
N = 20 epochs. Recall that the i-th component of our probe
signal, namely, αn(i) is the trace of the inverse predicted
covariance matrix for target i. We generated the probe signal
as αn(i) ∼ Unif(0, 0.05). The response βn of the cognitive
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(c) Cobb-Douglas utility U(β) =
√
β(1)β(2).
Fig. 4: Recovered utility function for a cognitive radar which
maximizes U(β) with linear budget constraint α′nβ ≤ 1. The
red dots show the response vectors βn selected by the radar.
radar which optimizes its beam allocation was obtained by
maximizing the Cobb-Douglas utility10
U(β) =
√
β(1)β(2) (β(3))2
subject to the linear constraint specified in (24).
10Cobb-Douglas utility functions are used widely in macroeconomics and
resource allocation [33], [34].
12
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
0
1
2
3
4
5
Fig. 5: Recovered utility functions for a cognitive radar which
maximizes det(R(β)) with a nonlinear budget constraint. The
red dots show the response vectors βn selected by the radar.
For a non-cognitive radar, we simulated its response as the
random outcome βn(i) ∼ Unif(0, 1) where the samples β(1)+
β(2) + β(3) > 1 are discarded. Recall that βn is the vector
comprising the fraction of time the radar allocates to each of
the m targets in epoch n.
1) Detecting Cognitive Radar given noisy response: Our
noisy measurement β¯n of the radar response βn was simulated
as (25) where the observation noise n(i) ∼ N(0, σ2), i =
1, . . . ,m, over a range of values for σ.
Given noisy data set Dobs =
{(
αn, β¯n
)
: n ∈ {1, . . . , N}}
from the enemy radar, Figure 6a displays the statistic 1 −
FˆM (Φ
∗(β¯)) of our detector, namely left hand side of (31), for
both cognitive and non-cognitive radar cases. Recall from (31)
that when this statistic exceeds significance level γ, the radar
is classified as cognitive. As might be expected, Figure 6b
shows that for low noise variance σ2, the cognitive and non-
cognitive cases are easily distinguished. But as σ2 becomes
larger, the non-cognitive radar can be mistakenly identified as
cognitive, i.e., the probability of a Type-II error increases.
2) Detecting Cognitive Radar given noisy probe: Suppose
the radar observes our probe signal αn in noise as α¯n
as specified by (34) where the observation noise ζn(i) ∼
N(0, σ2) over a range of σ. Given the noisy data set Dobs =
{(α¯n, βn) : n ∈ {1, . . . , N}} from the enemy radar, Figure 6b
displays the statistic 1−FˆM (Φ∗(α¯)) of our detector, defined in
(39), for both cognitive and non-cognitive radar. As expected,
Figure 6b shows that increasing the noise variance σ2 results
in increasing the probability of Type-II error.
To summarize, Figures 6a and 6b display the performance of
the statistical tests (Algorithms 1 and 2) for detecting cognitive
radars. The figures show that when the probe or response
are measured with small noise variance, it is relatively easy
to distinguish between a cognitive and non-cognitive radar.
But for large noise variance, it becomes increasingly difficult
to distinguish between a cognitive and non-cognitive radar.
Below we show that by optimizing our probe signal, we can
significantly improve the performance of the detector in high
noise variance.
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(a) Statistic 1− FˆM (Φ∗(β¯)) defined in (31) for cognitive and non-
cognitive radar over a range of response noise variance σ2.
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(b) Statistic 1− FˆM (Φ∗(α¯)) defined in (39) for cognitive and non-
cognitive radar over a range of probe noise variance σ2.
Fig. 6: Statistical Detector for Cognitive Radar given Noisy
measurements of Response and Probe. When either the red or
blue curve is above (below) a value γ (significance level), the
detector classifies the radar as cognitive (resp. not cognitive).
D. Adaptive Optimization of Probe Signal to minimize Type-II
detection error
This section illustrates the framework of Sec.VI. We observe
the radar response in noise and probe the radar to identify if
it is cognitive. Using a numerical example, we show that by
adaptively optimizing our probe signal, we can substantially
reduce the Type-II error probability (identifying that the radar
is cognitive when it is not) while constraining the Type-I error.
The adaptive optimization of the probe signal is carried out via
the SPSA algorithm 3 on the objective function (41), namely
the Type-II error probability.
The setup involves the radar beam scheduling discussed in
Sec.IV with m = 3 targets and N = 20 epochs. We initialize
the probe vectors as α1(i) ∼ Unif(0, 0.05). Recall from (23)
that the elements αn(i) of the probe signal are the trace of
predicted precision of target i. We observe the response βn(i)
of the enemy radar in additive noise as in (25) where n(i) ∼
N(0, σ2) and σ = 0.1. Recall βn(i) is the fraction of time in
epoch n that the enemy radar allocates to target i.
For the cognitive radar, our simulation uses the Cobb-
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Fig. 7: Performance of SPSA Algorithm 3. Given the radar
response in beam scheduling amongst 3 targets, we adaptively
optimize our probe signal to minimize the probability of Type-
II errors in the detector, namely (41). Jˆk(αk) is the empirical
Type-II error probability (42).
Douglas utility U(β) = β(1)0.2 β(2)0.3 β(3)0.5 for the cog-
nitive radar. For the non-cognitive radar, the utility chosen
is U(β) = β(1)ζ1β(2)ζ2β(3)ζ3 where the preferences ζi are
generated randomly with Unif(0, 1) density at each epoch k
and then normalizing the sum to make them add to 1. (So the
response of the non-cognitive radar are random iid variables).
With the above setup, we used batches of L = 1000 samples
to estimate the empirical distribution of FˆM in (31). Then
Algorithm 3 was run for 200 iterations with the following
parameters: S = 100 trials were used to evaluate the empirical
Type-II error probability Jˆk(αk) in (42) with significance
level γ = 0.05. The gradient step size ω = 0.005 in (43),
µ = 0.005/k for the SPSA step size in Step 2c of Algorithm
3. Figure 7 displays the performance of the SPSA algorithm.
As can be seen, the Type-II error probability is decreased
significantly (almost 80%) by careful choice of the probe
signal. Thus our statistical detector (28) can adequately reject
non-cognitive radars.
Interpretation. The probe signal matters: In Sec.VII-C we
chose the probe signal as αn ∼ Unif(0.005). Then for σ =
0.1, Figure 6a shows that the test statistic for the cognitive and
non-cognitive radar are almost identical; so it is impossible to
distinguish between a cognitive and non-cognitive radar. Yet
by optimizing our input probe, Figure 7 shows that we can
reduce the Type-II error probability to less than 0.2. This is
also apparent from Figure 7 where the empirical Type-II error
probability starts at 1 in the initial iterations and goes down
to 0.2 after optimizing the probe signal. We conclude that
judicious choice of the probe signal is crucial in identifying a
cognitive radar given noisy measurements.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Cognitive radars adapt their sensing by optimizing their
waveform, aperture and beam allocation. The main idea of this
paper was to formulate a revealed preference framework (from
microeconomics) to detect such constrained utility maximiza-
tion behavior in radars. As mentioned in the introduction, such
methods generalize classical inverse reinforcement learning.
The main results of the paper are:
(i) Spectral revealed preferences algorithms to detect if a
radar is optimizing its waveform. Our probe input comprises
purposeful maneuvers that modulate the spectrum (vector of
eigenvalues) of the state noise covariance matrix. The radar
responds with an optimized waveform which modulates the
spectrum of the observation noise covariance matrix. The
spectra of the state and observation noise covariance matrices
were used in Afriat’s theorem to detect utility maximization
behavior in radar waveforms. A generalization involving non-
linear budgets and the algebraic Riccati equation was obtained.
We presented similar methods to detect if a radar is optimizing
a utility function when it allocates its beam among multiple
targets.
(ii) We then developed stochastic revealed preference tests
when either the enemy radar’s response is observed by us
in noise, or the enemy radar observes our input in noise.
Specifically, we developed a statistical hypothesis test to detect
utility maximization behavior by the radar. We gave tight
bounds for the Type-I error of the detector.
(iii) Finally we presented an SPSA based stochastic optimiza-
tion algorithm to adaptively interrogate the enemy radar to
detect if it is cognitive. The algorithm minimizes the Type-II
detection error subject to constraints on the Type-I error.
Extensions. This paper focused on detecting radars that
adapt waveforms to improve tracking. The ideas can be ex-
tended to radars which adapt waveforms to improve detection
(in clutter and jamming). In this paper, our probing of the
enemy radar was performed via purposeful maneuvers by
modulating our state covariance matrix Q. To extend the result
to the latter case, our probing of the enemy radar will involve
emitting certain classes of signals and modifying reflected
signals so that we can ascertain how the radar changes its
waveform to improve detectability.
Finally, the methodology in this paper is an early step in
understanding how to design stealthy cognitive radars whose
cognitive functionality is difficult to detect by an observer. In
future work we will consider how to design a smart radar that
acts dumb?. This generalizes the physics based low-probability
of intercept (LPI) requirement of radar (which requires low
power emission) to the systems-level issue: How should the
radar choose its actions in order to avoid detection of its
cognition?
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